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Abstract
Martin Smith has recently proposed, in this journal, a novel and
intriguing approach to puzzles and paradoxes in evidence law arising
from the evidential standard of the Preponderance of the Evidence.
According to Smith, the relation of normic support provides us with an
elegant solution to those puzzles. In this paper I develop a counterex-
ample to Smith’s approach and argue that normic support can neither
account for our reluctance to base affirmative verdicts on bare statis-
tical evidence, nor resolve the pertinent paradoxes. Normic support
is, as a consequence, not a successful epistemic anti-luck condition.
1 Normic Support
Martin Smith (2018) has recently proposed, in this journal, a novel and
intriguing approach to puzzles in evidence law arising from the evidential
standard of the Preponderance of the Evidence—puzzles such as the Paradox
of the Gatecrasher or the Blue Bus/Red Bus example.1 According to Smith,
the relation of normic support provides us with an elegant solution to the
mentioned paradoxes. Here is Smith’s definition of normic support:
[A] body of evidence e normically supports a proposition p just
in case the circumstance in which e is true and p is false would
be less normal, in the sense of requiring more explanation, than
the circumstance in which e and p are both true. (Smith 2018,
p. 1208; emphasis in original)
∗Forthcoming in Mind. I am indebted to Arif Ahmed and Martin Smith for discussion of
an earlier version of this paper, and to two referees and the editors of Mind for extensive
and very helpful comments. This work was partly supported by Marie Curie Actions
(PIIF-GA-2012-328969 ‘Epistemic Vocabulary’).
1See, for instance, (Thomson 1986).
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For ease of reference, let us formulate this definition as follows, where square-
bracketed expressions of the form ‘[p]’ denote the circumstance in which the
proposition p is true:
(NS) e normically supports p iff [e ∧ ¬p] is less normal than [e ∧ p].
As the above quotation suggests, Smith understands the notion of compara-
tive normalcy at play in (NS) in terms of requirements for explanation. Here
is another passage elucidating the notion:
[A]bnormal circumstances require more explanation than normal
circumstances do. [. . . ] If ticket #72 really did win the lottery, in
spite of the odds, then, while I may be surprised and delighted, I
wouldn’t try to find some special explanation for how this could
possibly have occurred. It could ‘just so happen’ that ticket #72
is the winning ticket and there’s no more to be said on the matter.
If, on the other hand, there was no sheep in the meadow, in spite
of the fact that there appeared to be a sheep in the meadow, then
there really would have to be some special explanation for how
this came about. Perhaps I’m looking at a dog disguised as a
sheep, or I’m taken in by some strange trick of the light, or I’m
hallucinating, and so on. Whatever the truth, there is more to
be said. (Ibid., pp. 1207-8; emphasis in original)
Since Smith defines his notion of normalcy in terms of requirements for expla-
nation, our above definition of normic support is equivalent to the following
principle:
(NS′) e normically supports p iff [e ∧ ¬p] demands more explanation than
[e ∧ p].
Normic support, thus defined, is meant to be an epistemic anti-luck condition
that Smith has discussed and put to work in other writings (Smith 2016).
Here we shall focus on his application of the notion to puzzles arising from
the legal standard of proof of the Preponderance of the Evidence. Before
turning to Smith’s proposed solution, however, let us briefly reproduce one
of the puzzle cases giving rise to the paradox at issue.
2 The Paradox of the Gatecrasher
In most common law countries, the standard of proof in civil proceedings is
the Preponderance of the Evidence, also sometimes referred to as the balance
of probabilities or the standard of more likely than not :
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(PE) p meets the standard of proof in civil proceedings iff P(p|e) > .5.2
Consider an example for illustration:3
The Gatecrasher – Version A
The organizers of the local rodeo decide to sue John for gate-
crashing their Sunday afternoon event. Their evidence is as fol-
lows: John attended the Sunday afternoon event—he was seen
and photographed on the main ranks. No tickets were issued, so
John cannot be expected to prove that he bought a ticket with a
ticket stub. However, a local police officer observed John climb-
ing the fence and taking a seat. The officer is willing to testify in
court.
Given standard assumptions about the reliability of eyewitness testimony,
the probability, conditional on the evidence, that John gatecrashed is well
above the threshold of .5—namely, at roughly .7.4 The standard of proof is,
accordingly, met in the above case, and John is found liable to pay damages
to the organizers of the rodeo. However, a puzzle arises from PE once we
consider a slight variant of the above Gatecrasher example:
The Gatecrasher – Version B
The organizers of the local rodeo decide to sue John for gate-
crashing their Sunday afternoon event. Their evidence is as fol-
lows: John attended the Sunday afternoon event—he was seen
and photographed on the main ranks during the event. No tick-
ets were issued, so John cannot be expected to prove that he
bought a ticket with a ticket stub. However, while 1,000 people
were counted in the seats, only 300 paid for admission.
On evaluating the evidence in this case it is again obvious that the evidential
probability that John gatecrashed is well above the threshold of .5. Given the
2‘e’ here represents the total relevant and admissible evidence presented in court.
3The example originates from (Cohen 1977, pp. 74-81).
4I assume here a prior probability that the defendant is at fault of .5, which results—
according to (Fields 2013, p. 1799)—in a posterior probability of .77. As Fields (ibid.)
points out, the probability that the defendant is at fault given positive identification falls
below .5 only if the prior probability that the defendant is at fault is below roughly .3.
See (Schauer 2003, p. 317, fn. 15) for further references on the reliability of eyewitness
testimony.
A referee points out that it is controversial to assume a prior probability of .5 here,
as doing so assumes a version of the principle of indifference. I shall refrain from a
discussion of the principle of indifference in this paper and note that, intuitively, the
posterior probability in Version A is comfortably above the threshold of .5.
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evidence—that is, given that 70% of the people in attendance at the rodeo
were gatecrashers—the probability that John gatecrashed is .7. However,
despite the fact that the standard of the Preponderance of the Evidence has
been met in Version B of our example, courts routinely find, with overwhelm-
ing consistency, for the defendant in such cases.5 And this accords well with
our intuitions about fairness and justice, for it just does not seem right to
find John, who was randomly picked out in the arena, liable merely because
70% of attendees at the rodeo gatecrashed. If such a case was allowed to
succeed, the organizers of the rodeo could, after all, in principle win similar
cases for every person in attendance at the rodeo, including the 300 people
that paid the entrance fee.
We thus face a puzzle. According to our intuitions, the court should find
John liable in Version A of the Gatecrasher, but they should not do so in
Version B—despite the fact that the standard of the Preponderance of the
Evidence is met in either case, and to the very same degree. Why, then, and
on what basis, are civil courts willing to violate PE so blatantly?
3 Smith’s Solution
Martin Smith argues that puzzles of the above type can be resolved by means
of his notion of normic support.6 In the A-version, Smith argues, the evidence
normically supports the proposition that John gatecrashed (henceforth ‘g’),
while in the B-version it does not. Thus, if we amend the standard of proof to
include reference to normic support as a necessary condition for conviction,
the Paradox of the Gatecrasher disappears. For ease of reference, let us refer
to Smith’s amended version of the rule of the Preponderance of the Evidence
as ‘(PENS)’:
(PENS) p meets the standard of proof in civil proceedings iff
1. P (p|e) > .5 and
2. e normically supports p.
To see in more detail how (PENS) avoids the paradox note that, in the A-
version of the Gatecrasher, [e∧¬g] demands more explanation than [e∧ g]—
that is, the circumstance in which the police officer testifies that g and g is
5That is, in cases involving what lawyers call ‘bare statistical evidence’. For a famous
example see Smith v Rapid Transit, Inc. Thomson (1986, p. 200) offers references to
further examples and their discussion in the legal literature, as well as a discussion of the
notion of ‘bare statistical evidence’.
6Smith does not discuss the Paradox of the Gatecrasher, but a structurally equivalent
example, the red/bus-blue/bus case. See (Thomson 1986) for discussion.
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false demands more explanation than the circumstance in which the police
officer testifies that g and g is true. This is rather intuitive. For if John in
fact gatecrashed, it is not further surprising if an eyewitness testifies that
he gatecrashed: John’s gatecrashing partly explains, after all, the eyewit-
ness testimony. Not so, however, if John did not gatecrash. If John did
not gatecrash, we demand some kind of explanation of why the eyewitness
testified that he did. Was the police officer trying to frame John? Did she
make an honest mistake? Did one of the actual gatecrashers look a lot like
John? Since no further explanation is demanded with respect to [e ∧ g], but
it seemingly is so with respect to [e∧¬g], Smith concludes that the evidence,
in the A-version, normically supports the proposition that John gatecrashed.
The situation is crucially different in the B-version of the Gatecrasher.
For, in the B-version, neither [e∧ g] nor [e∧¬g] require further explanation.
In particular, the circumstance in which 70% of attendees gatecrashed and
John is one of the gatecrashers does not demand further explanation: if 70%
of attendees gatecrashed, it is not further surprising that John, who was ran-
domly picked out by the organizers, gatecrashed. Similarly, the circumstance
in which 70% of attendees gatecrashed and John paid the entrance fee does
not demand further explanation either. For if 30% of attendees did not gate-
crash, it is not further surprising that John, who was randomly picked out by
the organizers, belonged to the 30% of fee-paying customers. Thus, in the B-
version of the Gatecrasher, [e∧¬g] does not demand more explanation than
[e∧g]. Given Smith’s definition (NS′), it therefore follows that the statistical
evidence in the B-version does not normically support the proposition that
John gatecrashed.
Smith’s account explains rather elegantly our intuitions in the Paradox
of the Gatecrasher. In the A-version, the evidence normically supports the
proposition that John gatecrashed, while that is not so in the B-version—
despite the fact that the evidence supports that proposition, from a purely
probabilistic standpoint, to exactly the same degree in either case.
4 Statistical Evidence and Normic Support
The idea that, in the Gatecrasher case, the statical evidence cannot gener-
ate the need for an explanation is rather intuitive and convincing. For the
fact that a randomly selected attendee belongs to the large percentage of
gatecrashers or, alternatively, to the smaller percentage of fee-payers, indeed
doesn’t require further explanation. Does this mean, however, that statistical
evidence can never provide normic support?
To address this question further consider the following principle, which I
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shall call ‘Generalization’ (G):7
(G) The fact that x is an F and a high proportion of F s are Gs cannot, in
and of itself, normically support the proposition that x is a G.
(G) makes a highly complex statement about the relationship between sta-
tistical and explanatory facts. To see what exactly it claims, we must refor-
mulate the principle in terms of explanation, by using Smith’s definition of
normic support (NS′) from §1:
(G′) The circumstance that [(x is an F and a high proportion of F s are
Gs) and x is not a G] cannot demand more of an explanation than the
circumstance that [(x is an F and a high proportion of F s are Gs) and
x is a G].
While (G′) appears plausible to some theorists, I personally have no intu-
itions about its truth-value. Independently of its potential intuitive appeal,
however, it is worthwhile noting that there are fairly clear-cut counterexam-
ples to (G′), and thus also to (G).
Consider the bark beetle. Interestingly, the bark beetle isn’t threatened
by climate change, even though 98% of insects are. This is surprising and
calls out for an explanation. Why isn’t the bark beetle threatened by climate
change, given that almost all other insects are? To see that the case of the
bark beetle provides us with a counterexample to (G′), let us instantiate as
follows:
(G′BB) The circumstance that [98% of insects are threatened by climate
change but the bark beetle isn’t] cannot demand more of an explanation
than the circumstance that [98% of insects are threatened by climate
change and so is the bark beetle].
I take (G′BB) to be false. As mentioned above, the fact that the bark beetle
isn’t threatened by climate change, even though 98% of insects are, is in
demand of an explanation—and more so than the hypothetical circumstance
in which the bark beetle is, just like the vast majority of insects, threatened
by climate change.8
But doesn’t (G) nevertheless appear intuitively plausible at first sight?
As mentioned above, I don’t think that it does. But there is a principle in
the vicinity that is very plausible indeed. Consider Random Picking (RP):
7Smith doesn’t explicitly commit to (G), but it is a plausible generalization of his views.
8For another counterexample consider Hydrona Africana, a South African plant that
does not capture energy by photosynthesis, despite the fact that 97% of plants do so. Intu-
itively, the fact that Hydrona does not photosynthesize, even though the vast majority of
plants does, is in need of an explanation—and more so than the hypothetical circumstance
in which Hydrona is like the vast majority of other plants in that it photosynthesizes.
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(RP) The fact that a high proportion of F s are Gs cannot, in and of itself,
normically support the proposition that the result of randomly picking
an F is a G.
(RP) is true. It is not further surprising or in need of an explanation if the
result of randomly picking an F is, against the odds, one of the very few F s
that are not Gs. But note that (G) and (G′) do not state that the results
of random pickings are not in need of explanations (of course they aren’t).
Rather, (G) and (G′) make highly complex claims about the relationship
between statistical and explanatory facts—claims that are by no means as
intuitively plausible as (RP) is.
The case of the bark beetle thus shows that statistical evidence can some-
times provide normic support for some propositions. As the example illus-
trated, the statistical fact that 98% of insects are threatened by climate
change together with the fact that the bark beetle is an insect normically sup-
ports the (false) claim that the bark beetle is threatened by climate change.
But the mentioned statistical fact crucially doesn’t normically support other
claims involving random pickings. Imagine we randomly select an insect, any
insect, and the result is the bark beetle. The fact that we randomly selected
an insect that is not threatened by climate change is not in need of an ex-
planation, no matter how unlikely: the selection was, after all, random. The
statistical evidence, therefore, doesn’t normically support the claim that the
insect that we randomly selected is threatened by climate change.
5 The Political Gatecrasher
If (G′) is false and statistical evidence does sometimes provide normic sup-
port, the question arises as to whether the intuitive appeal of Smith’s pro-
posed solution to the Gatecrasher is merely due to accidental features of
the Gatecrasher example and, in particular, due to the fact that it involves
random picking. Remember that, in the Gatecrasher, the plaintiff randomly
selected John for their lawsuit. Can we construe similar examples in which
the defendant wasn’t selected randomly but, say, on the basis of bare statis-
tical evidence? Consider the following example:
The Political Gatecrasher
The organizers of the local bullfighting decide to sue Luis for
gatecrashing their Sunday afternoon event. Their evidence is as
follows: Luis attended the Sunday afternoon event—he was seen
and photographed on the main ranks during the event. No tick-
ets were issued, so Luis cannot be expected to prove that he
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bought a ticket with a ticket stub. However, while 1,000 people
were counted in the seats, only 300 paid for admission. Flyers
by anonymous anti-bullfighting activists were found in the arena
claiming responsibility for the gatecrashing. Luis is a 22-year-
old political science student, and belongs, as such, to a group of
people who are extremely unlikely to attend a bullfighting event
under ordinary circumstances.
A few remarks are in order. To begin with, the case is analogous to the
B-version of the previous example, except that Luis hasn’t been chosen ran-
domly, but in virtue of belonging to a group of individuals of whom it is,
intuitively, abnormal to attend bullfighting events. It is, after all, unusual
and in demand of an explanation if a 22-year-old political science student
attends a public performance that includes the killing of animals for enter-
tainment. To strengthen this intuition further, assume that the pertinent
evidence presented in court consists of the following statistics:
(a) 86% of 20-25 year-olds disapprove of bullfighting.
(b) 83% of people with an academic background in social sciences or the
humanities disapprove of bullfighting.
Given these statistics, one might wonder why Luis, a 22-year-old political
science student, would attend a bullfighting event, if not in order to partic-
ipate in an anti-bullfighting protest. Was Luis there because his family has
a long tradition of watching the bullfighting every weekend? Was it because
his sister was performing as a torera that day? Was he doing research for a
term paper on bullfighting? Whatever the explanation may be, if Luis did
not gatecrash, an explanation is needed of why he attended.
Next, note that, no matter how unusual and abnormal (in Smith’s ex-
planatory sense) it is that Luis attended the event as a paying customer,
it is clearly inappropriate to find Luis at fault on the basis of the evidence
presented in court. After all, Luis could, for all we know, very well have been
a paying customer, no matter how unlikely that scenario is given his age,
educational background, and the percentage of gatecrashers amongst the at-
tendees. However, while it would be intuitively inappropriate to find against
Luis on the basis of the statistical evidence presented in the above case,
Smith’s standard of proof (PENS) is—just as the original standard (PE)—
satisfied in the example. Smith’s approach cannot, as a consequence, explain
why the court should not find against Luis in the Political Gatecasher, and
is, therefore, subject to counterexample.
To see this in more detail note that, on Smith’s definition, the evidence
in the Political Gatecrasher normically supports the proposition that Luis
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gatecrashed (‘g’), despite being bare statistical and intuitively unsuited for
passing a verdict. Consider the two relevant circumstances—that is, [e∧¬g]
and [e ∧ g]. As suggested above, the circumstance in which the statistical
evidence is as presented and Luis paid the entrance fee (and thus did not
gatecrash) demands more of an explanation than the circumstance in which
the statistical evidence is as presented and Luis did gatecrash as part of the
anti-bullfighting protest: for, if Luis did not gatecrash, why did he attend
the bullfighting in the first place? If, on the other hand, Luis did gatecrash,
the question why he attended the bullfighting does not really arise, for, given
the statistical evidence provided, we have an overwhelmingly plausible (and
probable) explanation—namely, that he gatecrashed as a participant of the
anti-bullfighting protest. In other words, e provides us with a powerful ex-
planation of g (Luis’s gatecrashing attendance), but not of ¬g (Luis’s non-
gatecrashing attendance). In summary, [e ∧ ¬g] demands more explanation
than [e ∧ g], and, given Smith’s definition of normic support (NS′), e normi-
cally supports g.
It might be objected at this point that it is unclear whether Luis’s non-
gatecrashing attendance would in fact be in need of an explanation. Note in
response that Smith leaves the notion of requiring an explanation intuitive
and only elucidates it by appeal to examples. Here are Smith’s comments on
the notion, repeated from §1:
If, on the other hand, there was no sheep in the meadow, in spite
of the fact that there appeared to be a sheep in the meadow, then
there really would have to be some special explanation for how
this came about. Perhaps I’m looking at a dog disguised as a
sheep, or I’m taken in by some strange trick of the light, or I’m
hallucinating, and so on. Whatever the truth, there is more to
be said. (Smith 2018, p. 1207; emphasis in original)
If we replace the pertinent details in this passage with those of the Political
Gatecrasher, an equally plausible elucidation results:
If, on the other hand, Luis was a fee-paying customer at the
bullfighting and not a politically motivated protester, in spite of
the fact that he is a 22-year-old political science student, then
there really would have to be some special explanation for why
he was there. Perhaps Luis was there because his family has a
long tradition of watching bullfighting together every weekend, or
because his sister was performing as a torera that day, or because
he was doing research for a term paper on bullfighting, and so on.
Whatever the truth, there is more to be said.
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I take it that these considerations are as plausible as Smith’s original ones
concerning the sheep in the meadow (especially so given the above-mentioned
statistics). If that is so, however, then it seems that we need an explanation
of why Luis was at the bullfighting in the very same sense in which we need
an explanation in the case of the sheep in the meadow.
What is more, it is worth emphasizing at this point that, just as in the
bark beetle example from the previous section, there are other, closely related
claims involving random pickings that do not demand further explanation.
Imagine the plaintiff randomly selected an attendee, any attendee, and the
result was Luis. Imagine further that Luis belongs to a tiny minority of
attendees—namely, to the class of fee-payers who are 20-25 year-old political
science students. Then, the fact that the plaintiff randomly selected an
attendee who belongs to this tiny minority is not in need of an explanation,
no matter how unlikely: the selection was, after all, random. But it should be
noted that the crucial point about the Political Gatecrasher is precisely that
Luis wasn’t selected randomly but rather on the basis of additional statistical
evidence. Intuitions about the fact that the results of random pickings are
not in need of explanations are thus irrelevant with respect to the Political
Gatecrasher.
We thus have, I take it, a case in which bare statistical evidence normically
supports the proposition that Luis gatecrashed. And given (PENS), Smith’s
normic version of the Preponderance of the Evidence, the court should find
against Luis. But that would, intuitively, be just as inappropriate as it was
in the original Gatecrasher example: no matter how unlikely it is, given
the statistical evidence, that Luis did not gatecrash, the possibility that he
paid the entrance fee is not eliminated by the evidence—eliminated in a way
that eyewitness testimony of Luis gatecrashing would.9 The intuition can be
elucidated further by noting that, as Thomson (1986) has pointed out, what
is wrong with bare statistical evidence is that it does not rule out epistemic
luck: one can have strong probabilistic evidence that Luis gatecrashed, as
9It is instructive to think of the elimination of a counterpossibility by ones evidence
along Lewisian or modal lines here (see Lewis 1996), according to which a world w is
eliminated by one’s evidence e just in case one does not have e in w. Note further that
not all error-possibilities (or ¬p-worlds) are, on Lewis’s approach, relevant: thus, one’s
evidence can very well eliminate the possibility that ¬p—in the sense that it eliminates all
relevant ¬p-worlds—despite the fact that the evidence does not entail p. This is usually
so in cases of reliable eyewitness testimony, but never in cases involving bare statistical
evidence. The notion of the elimination of a counterpossibility at issue here is thus not
a probablistic (and infallibilist) notion, according to which, say, a possibility of error p is
eliminated by e iff the P(p|e)=0 (i.e. iff e entails ¬p). The notion is rather Lewis’s modal
notion, which is, I take it, closer to our everyday, fallibilist usage of the terms ‘elimination’
and ‘ruling out’.
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the court has in the Political Gatecrasher, but it may nevertheless be true
that if one gets it right, one does so as a matter of luck incompatible with a
just verdict.10,11
6 Normalcy, Explanation, and Integration
It might be objected at this point that there is a view that is very much in
the spirit of Smith’s account and that is not subject to the counterexample
in §4. Consider the following definition, according to which normic support
requires that the target proposition p explain the evidence, while ¬p fail to
do so:
(NS1) e normically supports p iff p explains e and ¬p does not.
This view is, I take it, just as well-motivated by the examples Smith presents
in support of his view as (NS) and (NS′) are.12 However, before discussing
(NS1) further, note that the principle is, given the Asymmetry of Explanation
(AX), equivalent to the simpler and more digestible (NS2):
(AX) If p explains q, then ¬p does not explain q.13
(NS2) e normically supports p iff p explains e.
(NS2) defines an epistemic property that Susan Haack (2000) has discussed
under the label of explanatory integration.14 What is crucial here, however, is
that normic support as defined in (NS2) solves the problem posed by the Po-
litical Gatecrasher. This is so because the proposition that Luis gatecrashed
does not explain all of the evidence in the Political Gatecrasher. For instance,
it does not explain why 70% of the people in attendance gatecrashed or why
83% of people with degrees in the social sciences or humanities disapprove
of bullfighting.
10What makes the mentioned type of luck especially problematic is, I take it, that it is
not hidden from the court: the court knows (or is in a position to know) that epistemic
luck hasn’t been eliminated in the B-version of the Gatecrasher. This is different in cases
of correct judgments that are based on misleading evidence. In such cases the court is
also epistemically lucky, but the luck involved is not obviously incompatible with a just
verdict. (I believe that it is, but that is a topic for a different occasion (see [...]).
11Further examples can be construed by selecting a defendant by appeal to racial pro-
filing statistics or weapons choice statistics.
12See above §1 and (Smith 2018, pp. 1207-8).
13An anonymous referee points out that asymmetry also holds for the related notion of
probabilistic confirmation: if P(p|q)>P(p), then P(p|¬q)≤P(p).
14Haack tracks the notion back to (Quine and Ullian 1978, p. 79).
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While this result appears promising at first sight, (NS2) fails to classify
Version A of the Gatecrasher as a case of normic support. This is so because
not all the evidence in Version A is explained by John’s gatecrashing: it was
part of the evidence, for instance, that no tickets were issued, which is surely
not explained by the fact that John gatecrashed. In light of these problems,
one might aim to further amend (NS2) by demanding an explanation of only
certain pertinent parts of the evidence, rather than an explanation of all of
the evidence:
(NS2P) e normically supports p iff p explains parts of e.
However, normic support thus defined is subject to further counterexamples.
Consider what I have elsewhere (Blome-Tillmann 2015, pp. 106-7) called
the First of the Gatecrashers—an example in which the defendant is (unbe-
knownst to the court) causally responsible for the gatecrashing at the event.
The problem this example poses for the above principles stems from the in-
tuitive link between causation and explanation: the fact that g caused parts
of e ensures that g explains parts of e. Thus, normic support as defined
in (NS1), (NS2), or (NS2P) cannot solve the problem posed by the First of
the Gatecrashers, for the defendant’s gatecrashing in that example explains
parts the evidence in the example.15
Can we find a yet different approach to normic support that fares better?
One notable difference between Smith’s original (NS′) on the one hand and
(NS1) and (NS2) on the other is that (NS′) has a comparative element that
is lacking in (NS1) and (NS2). To reintroduce that comparative element,
consider the following principle:
(NS3) e normically supports p iff p explains parts of e better than ¬p .
This principle is, again, rather well supported by the motivating considera-
tions Smith cites in favour of (NS′). Note, however, that (NS3) is, just like
(NS1) and (NS2), troubled by the First of the Gatecrashers. For, in the First
of the Gatecrashers, g (the proposition that the defendant gatecrashed) ex-
plains e, and ¬g does not explain e. It thus follows that g explains e better
than ¬g, and thus that e normically supports g. Smith’s standard of proof
(PENS) is, again, satisfied—an intuitively implausible result.16
15Note that the First of the Gatecrashers is not obviously a counterexample to Smith’s
original account—that is, to the conjunction of (PENS) and (NS′). For, even if the defen-
dant’s gatecrashing is responsible for triggering all of the gatecrashing, the evidence that
John attended the rodeo and that only 300 of the 1,000 attendees paid for their tickets still
does not normically support, in the sense of (NS′), the proposition that John gatecrashed.
16A yet further amendment to Smith’s view introduces additional epistemic notions into
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7 Conclusion
Since the 1940s lawyers, judges, and jurists have drawn an intuitive dis-
tinction between two fundamentally different types of evidence—namely, be-
tween individual and bare statistical evidence.17 JJ Thomson (1986, p. 214)
has, in an important paper, observed that bare statistical evidence does not
eliminate epistemic luck. Intuitively, if one’s judgement is based on bare
statistical evidence, then one’s judgement is, if correct, correct as matter of
luck. Judgements that are based on individual evidence, such as eyewitness
testimony, however, are (if correct) intuitively correct not merely as a matter
of luck. Individual evidence, in short, eliminates an element of luck that bare
statistical evidence fails to rule out.
Smith’s normic approach to the Paradox of the Gatecrasher and to related
puzzles in evidence law is very much in the tradition of this distinction. It can
be fruitfully understood as an attempt to explicate the notion of individual
evidence, and thus as an attempt to produce an epistemic anti-luck condition.
However, just like competing accounts of individual evidence and epistemic
luck—such as Thomson’s (1986) causal account and Enoch et al.’s (2012)
sensitivity account—Smith’s approach is subject to counterexample.18 This
is, presumably, not only problematic for Smith’s attempted solution of the
Paradox of the Gatecrasher, but also for his larger epistemological project,
built around the idea that normic support is a successful epistemic anti-luck
condition.
The philosophical debate on the Paradox of the Gatecrasher is still in
its infancy. However, there is a common assumption underlying the current
debate—namely, the idea that the paradox must be resolved by distinguishing
and then analyzing or defining two fundamentally different types of evidence.
It is my opinion that this approach is misguided: Knowledge is the ultimate
epistemic anti-luck condition. I thus contend that a successful approach to
the problems at hand must put knowledge first.19 A knowledge-first account
the definition of normic support. One could, for instance, take the view that the court
must justifiably believe that the relevant explanatory facts occur, or must sensitively
or safely believe, or even know that they occur. Such a view, however, would not be
very much in the spirit of Smith’s normic account, for the main attraction of Smith’s
approach consists in the fact that he defines an epistemic notion that can account for the
phenomena—without relying on further epistemic notions that might themselves figure in
an independent solution to the Paradox of the Gatecrasher. (For an account of risk in the
legal realm in terms of safety see, for instance, (Pritchard 2015)).
17See (Thomson 1986, p. 200) for references.
18See (Blome-Tillmann 2015) for criticism of the mentioned views.
19Cp. (Williamson 2000).
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of the mentioned puzzles, however, shall be the topic for another occasion.20
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